Abstract. The matroid-based valuation conjecture of Ostrovsky and Paes Leme [OPL15] states that all gross substitutes valuations on n items can be produced from merging and endowments of weighted ranks of matroids defined on at most m(n) items. We show that if m(n) = n, then this statement holds for n ≤ 3 and fails for all n ≥ 4. In particular, the set of gross substitutes valuations on n ≥ 4 items is strictly larger than the set of matroid based valuations defined on the ground set [n]. Our proof uses tropical geometry, matroid theory and discrete convex analysis to explicitly construct a large family of counter-examples. It indicates that merging and endowment by themselves are poor operations to generate gross substitutes valuations. We also connect the general MBV conjecture and related questions to long-standing open problems in matroid theory, and conclude with open questions at the intersection of this field and economics.
Introduction
Gross substitutes valuations form an algorithmically tractable subclass of submodular functions on 2
[n] to R. They are of special interest to combinatorial auctions [KJC82, GS99, DKM01, AM02, RvGP02, BLM04, HM05, LLN06], have numerous applications and have been discovered and rediscovered in various contexts: matroid theory and optimization [Edm70, DW90] , algebraic geometry [GGMS87, Kap93, KT06, Spe08, BZ17] , and discrete convex analysis [MS99, Mur03] , see [Lem17] for a comprehensive recent survey. Kelso and Crawford [KJC82] put forward the notion of gross substitutes as a way to generalize the theory of pricing and ascending auctions that had been developed earlier for matching markets. When agents valuations are gross substitutes, competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [BM97] and the competitive prices can be found by a greedy algorithm [GS99] . From the agents' viewpoint, however, specifying an arbitrary gross substitutes function on [n] requires at least 2 n/ poly(n) values [Haj08, Lem17] . This presents a major practical difficulty in implementing combinatorial auctions with gross substitutes.
A number of papers have been devoted to finding constructive characterizations for gross substitutes valuations [HM05, Haj08, KTY14, OPL15, Lem17, Mil17, BPL18] . The general idea is to start with a class of known gross substitutes valuations, and close it up under operations that preserve gross substitutability. Two natural operations with simple economics interpretations are merging and endowments. With these operations, Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] proposed to start with unit demand valuations and called the resulting class endowed assignment valuations (EAVs). They showed that this family encompasses a large number of gross substitutes valuations frequently used in economics. Ostrovsky and Paes Leme proved that not all gross substitutes valuations are EAVs [OPL15] . They proposed to start with a richer class: weighted ranks of all matroids on a finite set [m] . The resulting class, matroid-based valuations (MBVs), is conjectured to be equal to the set of gross substitutes.
To make this conjecture precise, one needs to clarify the relation between m, the number of items that the matroids in the generating set are defined on, and n, the number of items in the target class of gross substitutes valuations. Let MBV m denote the set of all matroid-based valuations generated from weighted ranks of all matroids on all subsets of [m] , and GSV n denote the set of all gross substitutes valuations on all subsets of [n] . The MBV conjecture reads as follows.
1
Conjecture 1 (The Matroid-based Valuation Conjecture [OPL15] ). For each n ≥ 1, for all v ∈ GSV n , there exists some intger m(n) such that v ∈ MBV m(n) . In other words, GSV n ⊆ MBV m(n) .
The larger m(n) is relative to n, the more complex the starting class of weighted ranks one must start with, and thus the less attractive it is to represent gross substitutes valuations as matroid based valuations. Therefore, it is important to establish lower bounds for m(n). By definition, MBV m GSV n for m < n and MBV m contains many functions outside of GSV n for all m > n. Therefore, the case m = n is particularly interesting, for it is the only case where one could have to achieve equality between the sets MBV m and GSV n . Our main result completely characterizes the relationship between MBV n and GSV n for all n.
Theorem 2. For n ≤ 3, MBV n = GSV n . For n ≥ 4, MBV n GSV n .
The proof uses tools from tropical geometry, matroid theory and discrete convex analysis to characterize gross substitutes valuations which are irreducible. These are valuations in GSV n which cannot be written as the merge of any other functions in GSV n , except for the trivial merge of themselves with the all-zero function. Characterizing them is the underlying goal of the MBV conjecture, since closing them up under merging and endowment would give the generative description of GSV n starting with valuations defined on subsets of [n] only. For n ≤ 3, we enumerate all possible gross substitutes valuations by their geometric type, and show that all irreducible valuations are weighted ranks of the uniform matroids on [n]. For n ≥ 4, we introduce a new family called clique valuations, and show that they are irreducible but not in MBV n .
Our second main result characterizes the set of irreducibles amongst matroid-based valuations. It shows that merging is strongly tied to matroid union.
Theorem 3. A weighted rank valuation on [n] is irreducible with respect to merging if and only if the corresponding matroid is irreducible with respect to union.
Characterizing irreducible matroid is a long-standing open problem posed by Welsh [Oxl06, Problem 11.3.9]. General solutions are known only for binary matroids [LR73, Cun79, Daw85, Rec89] . Even if one accepts matroid irreducibility as a blackbox criterion, Theorem 2 says that their weighted ranks do not exhaust the set of all irreducibles. One may ask whether their union together with the clique valuations could generate GSV n . Again we show that the answer is no.
Theorem 4. For n ≥ 6, there exists irreducible gross substitutes valuations in GSV n that cannot be obtained from repeated merging and endowment of weighted ranks of matroids and clique valuations.
Intuitively, merging tend to produce 'smoother' functions with larger regions of lineality (cf. Lemma 13). This means any gross substitutes valuation with small regions of lineality tend to be irreducible. Furthermore, merging is not a local operation, so small local changes in irreducibles create more irreducibles (cf. Proposition 26). Our counterexample constructions for Theorems 2 and 4 are based on these observations. They indicate that merging is not a rich enough operations to generate gross substitutes valuations from a small subclass.
The endowment operation allows one to merge functions defined on 2 m parameters before restricting down to a subset of 2 n values. Endowment certainly enriches the class: the EAVs of Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] is the enlargement of the OXS clas of Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan [LLN06] via endowment [OPL15] . However, for large n there are many irreducibles as constructed in the proofs of Theorem 2 and 4. Therefore, one would expect that m has to be rather larger than n before all irreducibles in GSV n which are not weighted matroid ranks can be represented as endowments of weighted matroid ranks upstairs. In other words, it is unlikely that the MBV conjecture would hold, and even if it does, m(n) may be very large. Going forward with constructive descriptions of gross substitutes, one may want to supplement merging and endowment with other operations such as matroid rank sums [ST15] or tree-concordant sum [BPL18] .
Organization. Section 2 reviews the economics formulation and set notations. Section 3 gives a geometric interpretation of the merging and endowment operations through the language of tropical geometry, and uses them to prove Theorem 2 for n ≤ 3. Section 4 connects irreducible valuations under merging to irreducible matroids and proves Theorem 3. Section 5 introduces clique valuations and prove that they are not in MBV n , establishing Theorem 2. Section 6 proves Theorem 4. We conclude with a brief summary in Section 7.
Notations. For a set Q ⊂ R n , conv(Q) denote its convex hull. For an integer n, [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The indicator vector of a subset S ⊂ [n] is χ S ∈ {0, 1} n , defined by (χ S ) i = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ S. Definition of matroid terminologies can be found in [Oxl06] .
The economics formulation
Consider an economy with n indivisible objects. A function u : 2
[n] → R is said to be a valuation if u(∅) = 0 and u(S) ≤ u(T ) if S ⊆ T . By identifying S ⊆ [n] with its indicator χ S , we shall also view u as a function u : {0, 1} n → R. An agent with valuation u has indirect utility function f u : R n → R, which takes a price vector p ∈ R n , and maps it to the best profit that she can make under this price. That is,
For each p ∈ R n , the set of a ∈ {0, 1} n that achieves the maximum in (1) is the demand set of the agent at price p, denoted D u (p).
Definition 5 (Gross substitutes [KJC82] ). A valuation u on [n] has the gross substitutes property if: for any pair of price vectors p and p such that p i ≥ p i for all i ∈ [n], for any X ∈ D u (p), there exists X ∈ D u (p ) such that: if j ∈ X and p j = p j , then j ∈ X . Let GSV n be the set of all gross substitutes valuations defined on all possible subsets of [n]. For T ⊆ [n], the endowment of u to T is the valuation u(·|T ) on [n] − T , given by
For subsets S, T ⊆ [n], the merge of valuations u : 2 S → R ≥0 and v : 2 T → R ≥0 is the valuation u * v defined on S ∪ T , with
In economics terms, u * v is the valuation of a company formed by the merge of two agents with valuations u and v, respectively. The endowment to T is the valuation of an agent who started with T , so it measures how much another subset of items S adds to what she already had. In the discrete convexity literature, merging is called convolution and endowment is marginal valuation [Mur03, §6] . Both of these operations preserve gross substitutability.
Lemma 6 ([Mur03], Theorem 6.15). If u, v ∈ GSV n and T ⊂ [n], then u * v ∈ GSV n , and u(·|T ) ∈ GSV n .
For S ⊆ [n], let E = (S, I) be a matroid with independence sets I. The weighted matroid rank function ρ w : 2 S → R ≥0 with weight w ∈ R n ≥0 is defined by (2) ρ w (T ) = max{ i∈I w i : I ∈ I, I ⊆ T }.
w is the rank function of the matroid E. Weighted matroid rank functions are also called weighted matroid valuations [OPL15] . We will call them weighted rank for short.
for some w ∈ R n ≥0 . Then u is the weighted rank of the uniform matroid U 1,S of rank 1 on the ground set S. It is also called a unit demand valuation, and can represented graphically as a bipartite graph with [n] nodes on the left, labelled 1 to n, and one node A on the right, The following result summarizes the relationship between MBV m and GSV n for general m and n. In particular, it shows that Conjecture 1 can hold at the finite level, that is, MBV m = GSV n , only if m = n.
Corollary 9. For any m, n ≥ 1, MBV m ⊆ GSV n for all m < n, and MBV m contains valuations that are not in GSV n for all m > n.
Proof. By definition, MBV n MBV n+1 , thus it is sufficient to consider the cases m = n and m = n + 1. By Lemmas 6 and 7, MBV n ⊆ GSV n . Now, MBV n+1 contains weighted rank of matroids defined on [n + 1], while GSV n only contains gross substitutes valuations defined on subsets of [n] . Therefore, MBV m contains valuations outside of GSV n .
The geometry of merging
In this section, we show that under the tropical algebra, merging corresponds to multiplication and truncation of polynomials. This allows us to interpret this operation geometrically, and thereby gives a constructive proof that GSV n = MBV n for all n ≤ 3. Tropical geometry forms a bridge between economics problems with discrete outcomes, polyhedral geometry, matroid theory and algebraic geometry. There is a growing literature on tropical methods auction theory and mechanism design [BK16, CT16, LT17, TY18] . For an introduction to tropical geometry, see [MS15] .
Consider the max-plus tropical algebra (R, , ⊕), where a b := a+b and a ⊕ b := max(a, b).
for p ∈ R n , where A ⊂ N n is its support, and (f [a] ∈ R : a ∈ A) are its coefficients. Say that two polynomials are equal if they equal as an algebraic expression, that is, each of their coefficients agree. Say that f is multiaffine if it is square-free, that is, A ⊆ {0, 1}
n . The multiaffine part of f , denoted f ↓ , is the tropical polynomial
The regular subdivision ∆ f of A induced by f is the collection of subsets of A obtained by projection of faces of f onto A. That is,
The elements of ∆ u are called cells of the subdivision. If
say that σ is the cell of ∆ f supported by p. The convex hull of a cell is called a face. Note that a cell is a finite set of integer points while a face is a polytope. Let us summarize the relevance of these polynomials to the combinatorial auction setting. n induced by gross substitutes valuations defined on two items, up to permutation of the item labels. A valuation v on 2
[2] must satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(1) = w 1 , v(2) = w 2 for some w 1 , w 2 ≥ 0, and v({1, 2}) = w 1 + w 2 − a for some 0 ≤ a ≤ min(w 1 , w 2 ). When a > 0, ∆ v subdivides the square into two triangles, shown in the top of Figure 1 . This subdivision consists of 4 cells of dimension 0 (the four vertices of the square), 5 cells of dimension 1 (pairs of vertices that make up the five edges), and 2 cells of dimension 2 (the set of vertices that make up the three triangles). We say that the triangles are the full-dimensional faces of ∆ v . When a = 0, ∆ v does not subdivide the square at all. It has one full-dimensional face, namely, the square itself. This is called the trivial subdivision. In each case, v can written as the merge of weighted matroid ranks on 2 items, as shown in Figure 1 . Therefore, GSV 2 = MBV 2 . Lemma 11. For S, T ⊆ [n], let u be a valuation on S and v be a valuation on T . Then
In particular, for all a ∈ {0, 1} n ,
Corollary 12. Let u, v : {0, 1} n → R be valuations. Then σ p is a cell of ∆ fu * v supported by p ∈ R n if and only if
where σ u p is the cell of ∆ fu supported by p, and σ v p is the cell of ∆ fv supported by p.
Proof. By a direct computation, one finds that for all p ∈ R n , if
n is a cell of ∆ fu fv supported by p, then
Lemma 11 then implies (3).
Equation (3) of Corollary 12 holds at the level of cells, and not at the level of faces. That is, while
In other words, taking convex hull and taking integer points do not generally commute, see [TY18] for a concrete example. For gross substitutes valuations, however, these two operations do commute. This distinction is precisely the difference between a combinatorial auction with competitive equilibrium and one without [DKM01, DK04, BK16, TY18].
where σ u p is the face of ∆ fu supported by p, and σ v p is the face of ∆ fv supported by p.
3.1. Proof of Theorem 2 for n ≤ 3. We now prove GSV n = MBV n for all n ≤ 3. The case n = 1 is trivial. The case n = 2 is shown in Example 2. For n = 3, we shall enumerate all possible regular subdivisions ∆ v for v ∈ GSV n , and gives an explicit decomposition of v in each case as a merge of functions in MBV n . As it turns out, we shall not need the endowment operation. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider v supported on [ Figures 5 to 12 show a parametrization of v at other vertices of the cube on the left. The captions give the conditions that the parameters must satisfy so that ∆ v is the prescribed subdivision. The RHS of these figures show that v is a max bipartite matching, in other words, it is a merge of unit demand valuations (cf. Example 1). Therefore, v ∈ MBV 3 , as required.
Corollary 16. For n ≤ 3, any gross substitutes valuation v ∈ GSV n can be written as the convolution of unit-demand valuations. That is, for n ≤ 3, the classes gross substitute valuations, matroid-based valuations, endowed assignment valuations and XOS are all equal.
Irreducible gross substitutes valuations and irreducible matroids
This section spells out the crucial connection between the merging operation and taking matroid union. We use this to prove Theorem 3 which characterizes all irreducible valuations in MBV n .
Definition 17 (M -irreducible polytopes). Let
n be an Mconvex lattice polytope. Say that P is M -reducible if there exists M polytope P 1 , . . . , P r ⊆ [0, 1] n which are not vertices, r ≥ 2, such that
Say that P is M -irreducible if it is not M -reducible.
Definition 18 (Matroid union and irreducibility). Let S, T ⊆
Say
The independence polytope of a matroid E is the convex hull of its independence sets, that is P = conv{χ I : I ∈ I}.
The following result connects M -irreducibility, matroid union, and the merging operation.
Proposition 19. Let E, E 1 , . . . , E m are matroids on subsets of [n], with rank functions ρ, ρ 1 , . . . , ρ m and independence polytopes P, P 1 , . . . , P m , respectively. The following are equivalent.
(
Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (2) is a straight-forward translation of the definition of matroid union. That (2) is equivalent to (3) follows from Edmond's matroid intersection theorem [Sch03, Theorem 41.1].
Corollary 20. If P is the independence polytope of some matroid, then P is M -irreducible if and only if the matroid is irreducible.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that E is irreducible. Without loss of generality, assume that E is supported on [n] , that is, it has no loop. Let F be the matroid polytope of E. Since E has no loop, F is fulldimensional. By definition of weighted matroid rank, F is a face of ∆ ρ w . By Corollary 20, F is M -irreducible. Now suppose that ρ w = u 1 * u 2 for some u 1 , u 2 ∈ GSV n . By Lemma 13,
Since F is M -irreducible and fulldimensional, either F 1 or F 2 must identically be equal to F , while the other is the vertex χ ∅ . Without loss of generality, let F = F 1 . So F = F 1 ∈ ∆ u 1 . By Lemma 13,
for all S ∈ F ∩ {0, 1} n . In particular, this equality holds for all S which are bases of E. Now let S / ∈ I. Then
Therefore, ρ w (S) = u 1 (S) for all S ∈ [n], so ρ w is a irreducible. For the converse, suppose that E is reducible, so E = E 1 ∪ E 2 , for E 1 defined on ground set E 1 , and E 2 defined on ground set E 2 . Let w 1 be the restriction of w to S 1 , and w 2 be the restriction of w to S 2 . It is straight-forward to check that
Since E 1 = E 2 , ρ w 1 = ρ w , and thus ρ w is not a irreducible.
Proof of Theorem 2 for n ≥ 4
In this section, we introduce the family of clique valuations. We show by a direct computation that for n ≥ 4, they are irreducibles, and are not in MBV n . This establishes Theorem 2 for n ≥ 4. 
By [RvGP02, HM04] , v ∈ GSV n if and only if
and the maximum is achieved at least twice ∀S ⊂ [n], i, j, k / ∈ S.
We shall prove that v = v S,a,b satisfies this statement by an induction argument on n. Consider the base case with n = 4. Up to permutation of the indices, the possible partitions S of [4] are the following (see Figure 3 ).
• S = {{1, 2, 3, 4}}. Then v is the weighted rank function of the uniform matroid U 1, [4] with weights w 1 = w 2 = w 3 = w 4 = a. So v ∈ GSV 4 . • S = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}}. Then v = u * ω, where u is the weighted rank function of the uniform matroid U 1, [3] with weights w 1 = w 2 = w 3 = w 4 = a, and ω is the weighted rank function of the uniform matroid U 1,{4} with weight w 4 = b − a. So v ∈ GSV 4 . • S = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. Then i, j, k must have exactly two nodes in one partition, and the third in the other partition. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that i = 1, j = 2, k = 3. Then either S = ∅ or S = {4}. In each cases, we have and
Thus v satisfies (5), so v ∈ GSV 4 . This proves the base case. Now suppose that the statement is true up to some n ≥ 4. Consider the case n + 1. Let v = v S,a,b for some partition S of [n + 1]. Fix S ⊂ [n + 1] and i, j, k ∈ [n + 1], i, j, k / ∈ S. There are three cases.
(i) |S| ≤ n − 3. Then there exists some node i / ∈ S ∪ {i, j, k}. Remove i from the graph, and let w be the induced clique valuation on [n + 1] − i . Then
By the induction hypothesis, w ∈ GSV n . Therefore, (5) is satisfied for v at S, {i, j, k}.
(ii) |S| = n−3 and
Therefore,
So (5) holds. (iii) |S| = n − 3 and v(S) = a. Then we can contract all nodes in S, and replace them by one node 1 . Let w be the clique valuation on the induced graph on {1 , i, j, k}, with
Since w ∈ GSV 4 by the induction hypothesis, (5) holds for v. Therefore, v ∈ GSV n . Proof. Suppose that v = u * w for some u, w ∈ GSV n . Assume without loss of generality that v({1}) = u({1}) = a. For any i = 1,
. By the assumption on S, for each i ∈ [n], there exists some j ∈ [n] such that i and j belong to the same partition, so v({i, j}) = a ≥ u({j}) + w({i}) = a + w({i}).
So w({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Therefore, w is the all-zero function, so v = u. Thus v is irreducible.
Lemma 24. Let n ≥ 4, 0 < a < b < 2a. Suppose S = {S 1 , . . . , S m } is a partition of [n] such that |S r | ≥ 2 for each r = 1, . . . , m, and that m ≥ 2. Then v / ∈ MBV n .
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that v ∈ MBV n . Since it is irreducible, by Theorem 3, v = ρ w where ρ w is the weighted rank of some matroid E on [n]. By definition, v({i, j} ≤ a + c < v({i}) + v({j}), E is a matroid of rank one. Since v({i}) = a = w i > 0 for all i, this matroid is loopless. Therefore, E must be the uniform matroid U 1, [n] . But by the assumption on §, there exists some i, j
Proof of Theorem 2. We showed that for n ≤ 3, MBV 3 = GSV 3 in Section 3. For n ≥ 4, for each pair of real numbers a, b ∈ R such that 0 < a < b < 2a, and for S = {{1, 2}, {3, 4, . . . , n}}, the clique valuation v S,a,b is in GSV n by Lemma 22, but it is not in MBV n by Lemma 24. This shows that MBV n GSV n .
Proof of Theorem 4
In this section, we construct another large family of irreducibles for n ≥ 6 that cannot be obtained as clique valuations nor weighted matroid ranks, thereby proves Theorem 4. Our strategy is to start with the weighted rank of an irreducible matroid E, and modify it slightly to ensure that the new valuation v is still irreducible, but its regular subdivision ∆ v contains a desired M -irreducible polytope F . By choosing F appropriately, we can ensure that F cannot be a face of any regular subdivision coming from weighted matroid ranks nor clique valuations. This would prove the desired statement. The reason this proof requires n ≥ 6 is that it starts with a loopless irreducible matroid of rank at least two, and that the smallest such matroid is for n = 6 (cf. Lemma 27). We leave open the problem of establishing Theorem 4 holds for n = 4 and n = 5.
Let g, f : {0, 1} n → N be integer-valued valuations, g(∅) = f (∅) = 0, g submodular, f supermodular. A pair (g, f ) defines a (possibly empty) polytope
Say that (g, f ) is a crossing family if for all I, J ⊆ [n]
The next proposition is a general recipe for obtaining more irreducible M -irreducible polytopes from a given independence polytope of an irreducible matroid. It is a slight generalization of the g-polymatroid intersection theorem [Sch03, Theorem 46.1]. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 25. Let P (0, ρ) be the matroid independence polytope of an irreducible matroid. Let τ be any submodular function such that (τ, ρ) is a crossing family. Then P (τ, ρ) is M -irreducible.
We now use this result to construct the desired gross substitutes valuation. Let ρ w be the weighted matroid rank of a loopless irreducible matroid E of rank at least two. For each constant c > 0, define the valuation v c,ρ,w
Define the supermodular function g : {0, 1} n → N by g(∅) = 0, and , except for the emptyset, where u(∅) = −c < 0. Since the matroid E is loopless, all the singletons belong to the matroid independence polytope P (0, ρ). Therefore, ∆ u is obtained from ∆ ρ w by splitting the origin χ ∅ away from P (0, ρ), creating two faces (see Figure 4) . A short computation shows that these two faces are
and its complement,
Compared to ∆ ρ w , ∆ u has extra edges of the form χ { i} − χ { j}. Since ρ w ∈ GSV n , by Theorem 15, u ∈ GSV n . Note that P (g, ρ) is a face of ∆ v . It is straight-forward to check that (g, ρ) is a crossing family. By Proposition 25, P (g, ρ) is M -irreducible. Since the matroid E is loopless and has rank at least two, P (g, ρ) contains {χ { i} : i ∈ [n]}, and at least one more point in [0, 1] n with sum at least two. Therefore, it is fulldimensional. Now, suppose that v = ω * τ for some ω, τ ∈ GSV n . Since P (g, ρ) is a full-dimensional M -irreducible face of ∆ v , P (g, ρ) must be a face of either ∆ ω or ∆ τ . Suppose without loss of generality that it is a face of ∆ ω . This means v(I) = ω(I) for all χ I ∈ P (g, ρ).
. Thus v is irreducible. For the second claim, since v is irreducible and full-dimensional, it is sufficient to show that v is not the weighted rank of some irreducible matroid E , or some clique valuation. In the first case, suppose for contradiction that v is the weighted rank of some matroid E . Then the largest cell of ∆ v that contains the origin must equal to the independence polytope of E . But this cell this the simplex P 0 , therefore, E is the uniform matroid of rank 1 on n. But for I = {i, j} an independent set in E with rank 2, this implies v({i, j}) = max(w i + c, wj c )
By definition of v in (8), we have v({i, j}) = w i + w j + c.
Since w ∈ R n >0 , these two quantities cannot be equal, a contradiction. Therefore, v is not a weighted matroid rank. In the second case, suppose for contradiction that it is the clique valuation parametrized by (S, a, b). Then one would necessarily have v i = a for all i, but this is false. So v is not a clique valuation.
Proof of Theorem 4. For n = 6, the graphical matroid on the complete graph on four vertices M (K 4 ) is a loopless, irreducible binary matroid of rank 3 [Oxl06, p428] . Lovász and Recski [LR73] showed that binary matroids are irreducible if and only if they are connected and their one-element deletions are also connected. These properties and being loopless are preserved under parallel extensions, therefore, there is at least one loopless irreducible matroid for each n ≥ 6. For each n, let E be such a matroid. For each weighted rank ρ w of E, construct v as (8). Proposition 26 applied to v implies Theorem 4. (8) is constructed from ρ w such that its regular subdivision ∆ v splits the origin away from this face while leaving the other faces of the regular subdivision the same. This creates two new faces: the standard simplex on [n], and the complement P (g, ρ). Since the matroid is irreducible, P (g, ρ) is M -irreducible, and this face witnesses the irreducibility of v in GSV n .
We remark that the construction in the proof of Theorem 2 does not apply for n ≤ 5 since there are no loopless irreducible matroids on at most 5 elements of rank at least two.
Lemma 27. Let n ≤ 5 and E be an irreducible matroid without loop on [n] . Then E is the uniform matroid on [n] of rank 1.
Proof. Let U r,S denote the uniform matroid of rank r on the ground set S. It is clear that U 1,[n] is irreducible. Now suppose that E is another irreducible matroid. Then E must be connected, and its one-element deletions must also be connected [Rec89] . Exhaustive enumeration using the database of matroid [MMIB12, MMIB19] and the software Sage [TheYY] shows that the only matroids E on n ≤ 5 elements that satisfies these properties are U 2, [4] , U 2, [5] , U [3],5 , and the matroid E 2 of rank 2 on 5 elements, obtained by taking U 2, [5] and excluding {1, 2} from its set of bases. By direct computations,
Therefore, none of these matroids are irreducible.
Summary and Open Questions
The matroid-based valuation (MBV) conjecture states that all gross substitutes valuations on at most n items can be generated from repeatedly merging and taking the endowments of weighted rank of matroids defined on subsets of at most m items. For finite n, equality can be achieved between these two classes if and only if m = n. In this paper we proved that this finite version of the MBV conjecture holds when the number of items n is at most 3, and fails for all n ≥ 4. Our proof is constructive: for small n it gives an explicit decomposition based on the geometry of gross substitute valuations, for large n it gives a large family of gross substitutes valuations that cannot be obtained through merging and endowments of weighted ranks. We also showed that some matroid-based valuations themselves are also the merge of other matroid-based valuations, and went on to characterize all the extreme elements in this class. These are precisely the weighted ranks of irreducible matroids.
Our paper leaves three interesting open questions at the intersection of economics and matroid theory. First, our results indicate that merging and endowment alone are not rich enough operations to generate all gross substitutes valuations from a small subclass. Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] showed that a large number of gross substitutes valuations that arise in economic applications are endowed assignment valuations (EAV), a much smaller class of functions obtained by merging and endowments of unit demand valuations. It would be interesting to systematically generalize this class even further, not with the goal of generating all gross substitutes valuations, but to generate a larger and useful subclass with tractable representations. For example, the clique valuations contain unit demand valuations with constant weights as a special case. Could they be generalized to a weighted version so that they subsume the EAV class? What would be their economics interpretations?
The second open direction is: what are the class of all irreducible gross substitutes valuations on [n]? Our results show that characterizing this class is fundamentally tied to the long-standing question of Welsh on characterizing irreducible matroids. We remark that endowment generalizes matroid contraction. However, it is not immediately obvious that the endowment of a weighted rank of some matroid E is the weighted rank of the contraction of E. Is this true in general?
If not, what are the gross substitutes valuations which are irreducible under merging but can be obtained as the contraction of the weighted rank of an irreducible matroid upstairs? These questions are fundamental to tackling the general MBV conjecture, and we hope that they will fuel new developments at the intersection of theoretical economics and matroid theory.
Proof of Proposition 25. By Lemma 28, P (g, ρ) is a non-empty M polytope. Suppose for contradiction that it is not M -irreducible, that is,
where P i are M polytopes which are not vertices, r ≥ 2. By Lemma 28, for each i = 1, . . . , r, P i = P (g i , ρ i ) for some crossing families (g i , ρ i ), and ρ i the rank function of some matroids E i . Let
Note that by Lemma 30,
, so in particular, (g, f ) is a crossing family. We claim that
This follows from linear programming duality of a certain totally dual integral system. More specifically, for a weight vector w ∈ R n ≥0 , consider the following integer program:
.
Its dual is the following program in decision variables (z i , y
Write F : (z, y) → F (z, y) for the objective function of the dual. For a fixed T ⊆ [n], plug in w = χ T . Then the value of the primal program is max{x T : x ∈ P (g, ρ)} = ρ(T ) by Lemma 28. Now consider the dual program. We claim that we can choose an optimal solution where y Since (z, y) is optimal, (z , y ) is also optimal. Repeatedly apply this argument gives an optimal solution (z, y) with y Appendix B. Gross substitutes valuations for n = 3
Figures 5 to 12 accompany the proof of Theorem 2 for n = 3, which can be found at the end of Section 3. For each figure, the LHS gives a parametrization of v that is necessary to obtain this regular subdivision, the caption shows the conditions on the weights, while the RHS writes this valuation as a maximum bipartite matching. This establishes both Theorem 2 for the case n = 3 and Corollary 16. 
